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Per IEC 61511-1 Process Safety Time is defined as, “the time period between a failure occurring 
in the process or the basic process control system (with the potential to give rise to a hazardous 
event) and the occurrence of the hazardous event if the safety instrumented function is not 
performed”.   
This paper will discuss how Process Safety Times were categorized, evaluated, and verified in 
order to comply with the standard and on a upstream mega project containing over 580 Safety 
Instrumented Functions, 350 of which were rated SIL 1 or higher. 
In the past, the practice has been to assign general overall values to Process Safety Times, many 
times for an entire project or possibly for individual units in a process facility.  On our recent 
mega project, our client challenged the engineering team to develop more customized values 
based on individual processes.  Our expectation is that in the future this expectation will grow 
more stringent and focused.  Our control systems and process engineering teams will have to 
work together to develop the necessary work processes and methods to generate, justify, and 
report these critical time values. 
Definitions 
Per IEC 61511 Part 1 Section 3.2.52.1, Process Safety Time is defined as, “the time period 
between a failure occurring in the process or the basic process control system (with the potential 
to give rise to a hazardous event) and the occurrence of the hazardous event if the safety 
instrumented function is not performed”.   
Per IEC 61508-4, Section 3.6.20,  Process Safety Time is the period of time between a failure, 
that has the potential to give rise to a hazardous event, occurring in the EUC or EUC control 
system and the time by which action has to be completed in the EUC to prevent the hazardous 
event occurring. 
Therefore, Process Safety Time is essentially; the time from an initiating event to the occurrence 
of an incident.   
 
Figure 1.0: Process Safety Time Timeline 
IEC 61511-1 Section 3.2.57 defines a protection layer as, “any independent mechanism that 
reduces risk by control, prevention or mitigation.” The intent of Process Safety Time, PST 
analysis is to ensure that the SIS protection layer is successful at preventing the imminent hazard.   
IEC 61511-1 Section 10.3.2 states the following as a SIS safety requirement:  “response time 
requirements for each SIF to bring the process to a safe state within the Process Safety Time.” 
The response time for a SIF will be from detection at the sensor to completion of the final 
element action.  After the final elements have completed their actions, there is a time for the 
process to respond to the actions before reaching a safe state.  This is referred to as the Process 
Response Time.    
The project was committed to demonstrate compliance with IEC 61511-1, Section 10.3.2. 
For the assurance of a safe design as well as for compliance with the IEC standard, SIF-RT and 
PRT as well as safety margins are all considered and summed to ensure that the SIF reacts within 
the PST. 
Process Safety Times are required to be considered for all independent protection layers, not 
only for safety instrumented functions.  When considering the implementation of an alarm, for 
example, there must be an associated expected time frame in which an operator response or 
intervention to the alarm is required in order for it to be effective.  Similarly with PSVs, these 
devices are sized and set at a pressure to allow mitigation of system over-pressure / rupture. 
The analysis this paper will discuss focuses on Process Safety Times applicable for safety 
instrumented functions. 
PST for a SIF is required to be defined / provided in the project’s Safety Requirements 
Specification, but little direction is provided on how it should be assessed. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
On a project, PST analysis is a joint effort among a number of responsible parties.  These include 
the client, who will assume ownership and ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of the 
facility; the General Contractor, who has responsibility for the safe design of systems for the 
facility; the Main Automation Contractor, who has responsibility for implementation of control 
and safety related items; and, on occasion, third party vendors who supply packaged systems for 
the project. 
The Client will supply or approve project specifications to be used by the General Contractor, 
and others, in the development and design of the facility.  The Client may have a core group that 
directs and coordinates project activities on a wide range of projects and may participate in 
development of and/or approve Process Safety Times developed by an individual project.  The 
client may also supply discipline engineers to oversee specific projects on an ongoing basis.  The 
assigned client engineers may include a control systems engineer and a process/facility engineer.  
Additionally, client operations personnel from a specific facility may participate in the review 
and approval of Process Safety Times based on actual facility operating experience. 
The General Contractor will bear the overall responsibility for development of a Safety 
Requirements Specification and for the establishment of Process Safety Times on a project 
working with an inter-discipline team of process, control systems, and mechanical engineers. 
The MAC is tasked with implementation of the Process Safety Times in the MAC supplied 
hardware, configuration, and programming based on project supplied design documents.  
Software Acceptance Testing will demonstrate that the required Process Safety Times in the 
configuration and programming align the provided design documents. 
Third party vendor documents will be consulted and evaluated as required to ensure that any 
Process Safety Time associated with a third party vendor package is capable of meeting the 
required Process Safety Time. 
Project Methodology 
After HAZOP, LOPA and SIL assignments for the project were completed, the resulting number 
of SIFs were 580, 350 of which were rated SIL 1 or higher.  Given the number of SIFs which 
required PST evaluation and the schedule for confirming / finalizing process limits and set-
points, the project was tasked with developing a method of PST evaluation to identify and 
mitigate any deficiency finding within the project timeframe while still complying with the IEC 
61511 standard. 
The general practice in the past regarding evaluation or Process Safety Time has been based on 
generally assigning a maximum operating time for shutdown valves.  A project might set a value 
to cover all shutdown valves regardless of size or process, or there may be varying values 
established on valve size, with larger valves being assigned a longer operating time than smaller 
valves.  Once these times were established it was up to control systems engineering personnel to 
specify the correct shutdown valves and auxiliary equipment necessary to meet the established 
operating times.  This might mean having to procure a quick exhaust solenoid valve to allow the 
valve to move to its safe position in the specified time frame. 
As the Process Safety Time practice evolved, process engineers based the times on a system 
response to process pressure, temperature or level disturbances or upsets. 
The project developed a document “Process Safety Time Analysis – Charter” which dictated 
how the Process Safety Times were to be categorized and evaluated with their associated SIF 
response time in order to demonstrate compliance. 
The document first set the scope boundaries for assessment.  All SIFs with a SIL rating of SIL 1 
or higher would require PST evaluation.  This prioritized the PST assessment and reduced / 
avoided overloading with non-critical items.   Also, no mitigative SIFs would be evaluated (Fire 
& Gas). 
SIFs which were part of a standard vendor supplied package would not be evaluated, as these 
SIFs would be regarded as ‘proven-in-use’, provided that the vendor(s) supplied these standard 
packages for many years and had done their own process safety evaluations. 
The document identified the responsible engineering disciplines: Process and Control Systems, 
where Process engineers were responsible for calculating the Process Safety Times and Control 
Systems would be responsible for calculating the SIF Response Times. 
The document defined the methodology for Process Safety Time evaluation.  All SIFs were 
initially screened and identified as either time critical (PST<60s) or non-time critical (PST>60s).  
SIFs with a PST>60s underwent a qualitative analysis with a descriptive assessment only.  The 
time critical SIFs (PST<60s) were classified as requiring additional quantitative analysis.  This 
was done based on system configuration and a steady state model. 
In each case the hazard cause would be aligned with the cause documented in the HAZOP and 
SIL assignment reports. 
To meet the demands of project schedule and finalize the design, areas of the process were 
segregated and prioritized for analysis.  Process Safety Time analysis would then be performed 
in order of priority as SIL assignments were completed. 
Typical SIF-RTs for each type of sensor, logic solver, and final element were determined and 
tabulated.  These times were then utilized to calculate the overall SIF-RT for each SIF with a SIL 
assignment greater than or equal to SIL 1. 
The end result was a deliverable listing each SIF (with a SIL assignment greater than or equal to 
SIL 1) along with its associated hazard cause, PST, and SIF-RT. 
Process Safety Time Analysis Evaluations 
PST calculations took into consideration design tolerances (short term temperature or pressure 
excursions) allowed by ASME / API codes.  Pressure excursions were modeled / analyzed to the 
PSV set-point.  This served to validate the SIS and the physical pressure relief as an independent 
protection layer. 
Of note, low pressure trips are typically used to mitigate against line ruptures or leaks (loss of 
containment scenarios).  In these cases, as the hazardous event has already occurred, no Process 
Safety Time analysis was done on low pressure safety instrumented functions. 
Process Safety Time calculations involving level measurement took into account overflow at full 
flow rates for HiHi trips and underflow at zero flow rates for LoLo trips. 
For pump and compressor trips, rundown times may need to be considered if they allow for 
hazard escalation. 
Project Considerations 
What if the PST is less than the SIF-RT?  The project considered the following options in order 
of cost and timing in effort to mitigate the deficiency. 
• Review the PST calculation and the assumptions which contributed to the PST 
calculation. 
• Consider altering the trip set-point of the input sensor; for example, raising the LoLo 
level set-point can give more liquid volume.  Lowering a HiHi pressure set-point will 
provide more of a pressure cushion before reaching overpressure. 
• Consider the addition of a quick exhaust solenoid valve to the actuator.  In some 
instances the main contributing factor to the SIF response time is the closure of a safety 
shutdown valve.  In one instance the project was able to reduce the SIF response time by 
adding a quick exhaust solenoid to an 8” safety shutdown valve.  This addition reduced 
the final element response time from 8s to 2s. 
• Consider the possibility of an additional or alternative IPL to the SIF. 
• Re-validate / evaluate LOPA scenario. 
• Another alternative and last resort was to consider the addition of logic to prevent or 
mitigate the cause of the scenario.  For example, the PST for overpressure on the 
production header was calculated to be 1.8s.  As commitments for a production rate were 
already made, altering the HiHi pressure trip set-point was not an option.  Per the 
HAZOP report the initiating cause of the potential overpressure scenario was documented 
to be the failure of a 30” safety shutdown valve.   
An advanced warning for the failure of the 30” safety shutdown valve was considered 
using the safety shutdown valve limit switches which were wired to the SIS.  If the limit 
switches for the valve read that is was travelling un-commanded by the SIS, then the final 
elements which were required to go to the safe state as part of the overpressure SIF would 
actuate.  By doing this an advanced warning of the failure of the SDV was essentially 
created and the SIS was programmed to act in the same manner as if the HiHi pressure on 
the production header was realized. 
Summary 
There is a general rule of thumb which suggests that the SIF-RT be less than or equal to half of 
the Process Safety Time; however, as the PST calculations were done to the PSV set-point and 
not to the time of occurrence of the unwanted event, this rule of thumb was not applied. 
At the end of the exercise, despite PST’s as low as 1.8s, the project was able to demonstrate 
compliance with the IEC 61511 requirement for each SIF with a SIL rating of SIL 1 or more. 
The development of this integrity critical document required collaboration from multiple groups:  
Process and Control Systems engineers, Clients, Mechanical package engineers / vendors, Safety 
engineers, and Subject Matter Experts.   
Safety consideration in the process industry must progress continually to ensure safety of people 
and the environment.   The evolution of the evaluation and implementation of Process Safety 
Time is an indication of how the industry engages in the process of taking standards and 
guidelines and developing them into the engineering process and final construction.   Putting 
safety first profits everyone involved from the client, the engineering and construction 
contractors, the public, and the environment.   Operating experience will help refine the process 
of developing the Process Safety Times for future projects. 
Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Analysis 
EUC Equipment under control 
HiHi High High 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IPL Independent Protection Layer 
LoLo Low Low 
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis 
MAC Main Automation Contractor 
Abbreviation Description 
PRT Process Response Time 
PST Process Safety Time 
PSV Pressure Safety Valve 
SDV Safety Shutdown Valve 
SIF Safety Instrumented Function 
SIF-RT Safety Instrumented Function Response Time 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SIS Safety Instrumented System 
 
 
 
